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“Likert items” are standard and widespread survey instruments. The most 
common version asks respondents to evaluate a statement by picking one of 5 (or 7) 
ordered responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. To interpret 
these answers, researchers often assume that respondents are sincere and report 
their true opinion with some random error. Yet, sincerity is not the only motive 
driving repondents’ answers. Competing motives, most famously motives related to 
partisan identity, also matter. We propose a simple decision-theoretic model of 
survey answers that incorporates these different types of motives. We first show 
that respondents can systematically exagerate their views when asked about them 
using Likert items. We then show how, under certain conditions, Quadratic Voting 
for Survey Research (QVSR) can minimize this bias. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At its heart, survey research tries to understand what 
individuals think and know about the world. Policymakers and 
social scientists conduct polls because they want to know what 
the public “thinks” on a given set of policy issues. This 
information can be used by policymakers to inform their 
decisions on specific policies. It is also used normatively by 
political scientists as a benchmark to judge the “quality” of 
democratic politics in a given policy arena.1 For example, in the 
area of gun policy, political scientists rely on the gap between 
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public opinion2 and policy to conclude that interest groups, such 
as the National Rifle Association, must be “capturing” the policy 
process to impose their preferences on democratic majorities.3 
This line of work relies on the assumption that surveys 
successfully measure preferences on political or economic issues. 
Most surveys rely on some variant of the Likert item, a 
survey technology developped in the 1930s by the psychologist 
Rensis Likert. Survey respondents are asked to evaluate a policy 
statement by picking one of five (or seven) ordered responses 
ranging from strongly agree/favor to strongly disagree/oppose. 
To interpret survey answers as a measure of “true” preferences, 
researchers need to assume that respondents are sincere when 
they pick a response category. Yet, there are good reasons to 
think that respondents’ answers are shaped by additional 
motives and that these motives can conflict with respondents’ 
desire to be sincere. 
One motive examined by Professors John G. Bullock, Alan 
S. Gerber, Seth J. Hill, and Gregory A. Huber is partisan 
cheerleading.4 They show that in surveys, strong partisans 
purposefully misreport facts about the state of the economy out 
of a desire to praise one party or criticize another. When this 
partisan motive is repressed (using monetary incentives to 
provide what one beliefs to be the true response), actors revert to 
answers that are closer to the “truth” and less predicted by their 
partisan identity.5 These results indicate that when partisan 
cheerleading provides more utility than the sincerity motive, the 
observed answer will be different from respondents’ true beliefs. 
In a related paper, Professors Carlos Berdejó and Daniel L. 
Chen find that, in weeks prior to United States presidential 
 
 2 In the past three decades, an average of two-thirds of American citizens surveyed 
have indicated support for making gun control regulations stricter. See Guns, (Gallup 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/UK3V-EA6C. 
 3 In recent work on regulatory capture, Professor Daniel Carpenter similarly relies 
on public opinion polls to measure the influence of interest groups. He argues that politi-
cal scientists first need to measure majority preferences and then look for evidence of 
interest groups moving policy away from these views to detect policy capture. This ap-
proach to survey data has been used in diverse areas, such as environmental, worker 
safety, food and drug, and labor regulations. Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and Measuring 
Capture, in Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, eds, Preventing Regulatory Capture: 
Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It (Cambridge 2014). For further analysis of 
the gap between public opinion polls and legislative action, see Gilens, Affluence and In-
fluence (cited in note 1). 
 4 See generally John G. Bullock, et al, Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Poli-
tics, 10 Q J Pol Sci 519 (2015). 
 5 Id at 563. 
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elections, judges on the US Courts of Appeals double the rate at 
which they dissent and vote along partisan lines.6 It is unlikely 
that the judges’ conception of a just decision has suddenly 
changed in the period preceding the election. What has changed 
is the possible returns of partisan cheerleading over sincerity. If 
highly experienced professionals making common-law precedent 
exhibit such a strong partisan bias, there is reason to believe 
that lay citizens answering political surveys (a comparatively 
low stake decision) should also, when faced with a conflict 
between signaling partisan and responding sincerily, deviate 
from expressing sincere beliefs or preferences. 
In this article, we propose a simple and parsimonious 
decision-theoretic model of survey answers, which includes both 
the sincerity motive and other competiting motives. We use this 
model to better understand how the match between true 
unobservable attitudes and observed survey answers varies with 
the survey instrument. We formally show that respondents are 
likely to systematically inflate their views when those are 
measured using Likert items. 
We also examine an alternative survey technology, 
Quadratic Voting for Survey Research (QVSR). The QVSR in-
strument gives respondents a fixed budget to “buy” votes in fa-
vor or against a set of issues. Because the price for each vote is 
quadratic, it becomes increasingly costly to acquire additional 
votes to express support or opposition to the same issue. In a 
first exploration, Professor David Quarfoot and his co-authors 
compare QVSR to Likert-based survey instruments by randomly 
assigning respondents to one method or the other on M-Turk.7 
We complement this empirical approach by proposing a decision-
theoretic analysis of the performance of QVSR versus Likert 
items. 
The paper contributes to existing research on quadratic 
voting (QV). In its original formulation, QV is intended as a 
means of arriving at efficient social decisions when voting on 
policies that will be implemented.8 Professor Steven P. Lalley 
and E. Glen Weyl primarily assume that influencing policy is 
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the main motivation of citizens.9 In contrast, we model the 
implications of QV in a very different context: survey research. 
In addition, we explicitly model other potential motives such as 
a sincerity motive and a partisan motive.10 We formally study 
how respondents solve the tradeoff between these potentially 
conflicting motives, depending on the survey instruments 
(Likert or QVSR). The model helps clarify the pros and cons of 
each survey intrument. Assuming the goal is to measure “true” 
attitudes, we lay out the conditions under which QVSR will 
outperforms Likert items. 
II.  A DECISION-THEORETIC MODEL OF SURVEY ANSWERS 
Consider a number of policy issues, on which citizens may 
have any opinion between two extreme antagonistic positions. A 
survey is run to evaluate where the citizens stand on each of 
these issues. In this paper, extreme should not be understood in 
terms of how radical the proposition is. Instead, in the spirit of 
Likert items, extremity measure the extent to which one agrees 
with (supports) or disagrees with (opposes) a clearly defined 
proposal. 
A. Respondents’ Motivation When Answering Surveys 
We assume that an individual may have (at least) two 
(potentially) conflicting motives when answering the survey. On 
the one hand, she derives some intrinsic utility from reporting 
her “true opinion” on each issue. This might derive from some 
expressive benefits (“I am happy to tell what my opinion is”), or 
this might be induced by a psychological cost of lying. We call 
this motive the “sincerity motive.” This is the motive generally 
assumed in the literature using survey data.11 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Before moving on, one quick note to readers well versed in public opinion re-
search: our emphasis is on the way in which survey technology affect the match between 
“true” and observed attitudes. In other words, unlike Professor John Zaller and scholars 
who build on his work, we are not examining the role motives such as partisan cheer-
leading plays in shaping a respondent’s underlying “true” attitude. Instead, we focus on 
the likelihood that this respondent will misreport it and how this likelihood might vary 
with the survey instrument. See generally, for example, Seth J. Hill, James Lo, Lynn 
Vavreck, and John Zaller, How Quickly We Forget: The Duration of Persuasion Effects 
from Mass Communication, 30 Pol Comm 521 (2013). 
 11 One assumption commonly made by social scientists using survey data is that 
they provide a faithful—if noisy—measure of respondents’ views. See generally, for ex-
ample, Christopher Achen, Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response, 69 Am Pol 
26 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1 
 
On the other hand, we hypothesize that an individual may 
also care about how her answers will be read and interpreted by 
other people, which might conflict with this sincerity motive. 
This additional motivation might encompass a variety of 
psychological mechanisms, depending on the context and the 
question. For example, imagine that the government is 
considering whether a specific reform should be adopted or not, 
and that a survey is conducted to measure public support for or 
opposition to this reform. The respondent might be willing to 
strategically use her answers to the survey to influence policy 
making. Another motivation for the respondent might be to 
signal to herself, or to whoever is going to read the survey, that 
she has some socially desirable traits. For example, she may 
want to appear altruistic, non-racist, tolerant, etc. She might 
also want to signal a group identity. For example, if she is a 
Republican, and she expects Republicans to take specific 
positions on some issues, she may suffer a psychological cost 
from moving away from these typical “Republican positions.” 
The partisan cheerleading mentioned by Professor Bullock and 
coauthors might thus be some combination of an identity motive 
(behave like a Republican) and an influence motive (get 
Republican policies passed). Whatever the source of this 
motivation, because of this “signaling motive,” one position is 
particularly attractive to the respondent, which might be 
different from where she really stands. 
B. The Utility Function 
To capture these two motivations (sincerity and signaling), 
we propose a simple general model describing how respondents 
answer surveys.12 Assume a survey is run to measure 
respondents’ views on 𝐾 different policy issues. A position on 
any such issue is modeled as a real number in the interval 
1, 1 , where the extreme positions 1 and 1 denote perfect 
agreement with two opposite position on a given policy issue.13 
 
Sci Rev 1218 (1975); Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder Jr, 
The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideologi-
cal Constraint, and Issue Voting, 102 Am Pol Sci Rev 215 (2008). 
 12 Our model shares some similarities with that of John G. Bullock, et al, Partisan 
Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics, 10 Q J Pol Sci 519 (2015) (cited in note 4), which 
studies systematic differences between Republican and Democrat voters in how they an-
swer factual questions about economic facts. 
 13 We here follow the common practice in survey research to ask respondents to 
place themselves on a single dimension. This dimension might run from full agreement 
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We assume that, on each issue 𝑘 1, .  .  . , 𝐾, respondent 𝑖 is 
characterized by two parameters also lying in the interval 
1, 1 , her “true” opinion, denoted by 𝑥 , and the opinion she 
finds the most attractive because of the signaling motive, 
denoted by 𝑡 . We call the latter her “signaling target.” 
We assume that the utility a respondent derives from 
answering the survey, denoted by 𝑉 , depends on her answers to 
the survey (her reported policy positions), denoted by 𝑥
𝑥 , .  .  . , 𝑥 ∈ 1, 1 , in the following way: 
𝑉 𝑥 𝐹 𝑥 𝐺 𝑥 , 
where functions 𝐹  and 𝐺  are single-peaked, and reach their 
maximum in 𝑥 𝑥  and 𝑥 𝑡  respectively. The first term 
in the utility function captures the sincerity motive. If for a given 
issue only this motive were present, the maximal utility an 
individual could get would be by reporting her true opinion on 
this issue. The second term on the right-hand side represents 
the signaling motive. If only this motive were present, the 
maximal utility an individual could get would be by reporting 
her signaling target. For the time being, we make no additional 
assumptions on functions 𝐹  and 𝐺  and on the signaling 
targets 𝑡 . In what follows, we will consider in more detail two 
examples of particular interest, one where the signaling motive 
is induced by a desire to influence policy, and the other where it 
is induced by a partisan identity. 
C. Survey Technology 
The survey technology constrains survey respondents by 
specifying the set of answers that are admissible, that is, the set 
of answers the respondents can choose from. For example, under 
standard Likert items, a respondent can pick any answer on a 
pre-determined number of ordered responses (for example, 
“strongly oppose,” “somewhat oppose,” “neither oppose nor 
support,” “somewhat support,” “strongly support”). Under 
Quadratic Voting, there is a maximum number of points that 
the respondent can use to answer, and the marginal cost of 
 
with a statement to full disagreement with the same statement. Another dimension   
often used is full agreement with a given statement (the government should be the only 
provider of healthcare services) and full agreement with its exact opposite (the govern-
ment should have no role to play whatsoever in the prevision of healthcare services). 
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moving away from the neutral answer (here 0) increases linearly 
with the distance to this neutral answer. 
D. Optimization Problem 
Individuals are assumed to choose answers (𝑥 ) that 
maximize the utility function 𝑉 , subject to the constraints on 
answers imposed by the survey technology. Equipped with this 
very simple model, we can predict how respondents will answer 
the survey. In particular, our interest will be to discuss whether 
these reported views are a good measure of the “true opinion” 
(𝑥 ). In the next section we describe answers under Likert items, 
and then turn to the QVSR technology in the following section. 
III.  PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL ANSWERS UNDER LIKERT ITEMS 
We consider first the case of Likert items. For simplicity, we 
will ignore the fact that there are in general only a discrete 
number of answers the respondent can choose from (“strongly 
favor”, “somewhat favor”, etc.); we will instead assume that she 
can pick any number in the 1, 1  interval. In that case, the 
set of admissible answers is simply 1, 1  and the individual 
solves the following optimization program: 
max
∈ ,
𝑉 𝑥 𝐹 𝑥 𝐺 𝑥 . 
Denote by 𝑥 𝑥 , .  .  . , 𝑥  the solution of this program. 
A. Properties of the Optimal Responses 
It is straightforward to check that the optimal answer on 
issue 𝑘 (𝑥 ) lies somewhere between 𝑥  and 𝑡  (that is, in the 
interval 𝑥 , 𝑡  if 𝑥 𝑡  and in the interval 𝑡 , 𝑥  
otherwise). Otherwise, the respondent could simultaneously 
improve on both objectives. Where exactly she will locate 
between these two positions depends on the shape of the 
functions 𝐹  and 𝐺 . 
1. Concave sub-utility functions. 
In particular, if the functions 𝐹  and 𝐺  are both concave 
with 𝐹 𝑥 𝐺 𝑡 0, there is a strictly interior solution. 
With Likert items, individuals answer by compromising between 
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their two motives. Answers incorporate information about both 
𝑥  and 𝑡 . 
2. Convex sub-utility functions. 
By contrast, if the functions 𝐹  and 𝐺  are both convex, 
then the objective 𝑉  is convex in 𝑥  and the individual either 
truthfully reports her true opinion 𝑥  on this issue, or she 
reports her “signaling target,” 𝑡 .14 
B. Systematic Misreporting and What It Means for Often Used 
Common Measurement Error Approaches 
One assumption commonly made by social scientists using 
political survey data is that surveys using Likert items provide a 
faithful—if noisy—measure of respondents’ “true” views.15 Most 
of the emphasis is on measurement error due to “format and 
survey context, errors made by respondents, and so on.”16 One 
suggestion is to minimize measurement error by constructing a 
scale that combines similar Likert items.17 This assumes that 
the covariance in the error term across K issues of the same “is-
sue area” is zero. 
In contrast, our model highlights the fact that respondents 
may instead deviate from their true views in systematic ways 
due to the signaling motives. As a result, misreporting (or 
“error”) will be correlated across items: combining these items 
into a scale or index will not address the bias introduced by 
these signaling motives. 
To illustrate this point, we document attitudinal patterns 
that are inconsistent with the dominant view of attitudes being 
measured only with random error. We present electoral cycles in 
such Likert indices developed by Professors Stephen 
Ansolobehere, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder Jr to 
measure economic and moral attitudes.18 We use the General 
Social Survey’s date of interview and cluster standard errors by 
 
 14 More specifically, an individual chooses 𝑥  𝑥  if 𝐹 𝑥 𝐹 𝑡 𝐺 𝑡
𝐺 𝑥  and 𝑥 𝑡  otherwise. 
 15 See, for example, Achen, 69 Am Pol Sci Rev at 1221 (cited in note 11);              
Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, 102 Am Pol Sci Rev at 216–17 (cited in note 11). 
 16 Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, 102 Am Pol Sci Rev at 217 (cited in note 11). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder Jr, Purple 
America, 20 J Econ Perspectives 97 (2006). 
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year of interview. Each subsequent figure presents specifications 
with a full set of quarter-to-elect dummy indicators omitting 
quarter 16 (so November–January after an election is the 
comparison group), and also controls for seasonality (January–
March, April–June, July–September, October–December). 
Figure 1 shows that Democrats are systematically more 
culturally conservative two quarters after a presidential election 
and two quarters after a midterm election (May–July). Figure 2 
shows that Republicans are more culturally liberal one quarter 
after these elections. In the appendix, the corresponding 
patterns for economic attitudes are less pronounced, with both 
groups being more economically liberal two quarters after 
midterms. Next we analyze group cohesion as it varies over the 
electoral cycle. We calculate the average standard deviation in 
responses to each question for Democrats and for Republicans. 
Figure 4 shows that two quarters after elections, Republicans 
have more within-group cohesion on cultural issues. Figure 3 
shows a similar pattern for Democrats two quarters after 
presidential elections. In the appendix, the pattern for economic 
attitudes are less systematic, though patterns still appear two 
quarters after elections (Fig. A1–A4). These patterns seem to 
contradict the hypothesis of random errrors. 
When political opinions are measured using Likert items, 
there are a number of issues on which some respondents are 
likely to systematically misreport their true views. What can be 
said about the direction of this deviation? Will individuals 
appear in their answers to be more or less extreme than what 
they really are? In full generality, this deviation can go in any 
direction, depending on the relative position of the true opinion 
(𝑥 ) and of the partisan target (𝑡 ). Indeed, if 𝑥 𝑡  then 
respondents will appaear more extreme. In the next two 
sections, we study two such situations where “systematic 
exaggeration” is likely to occur, and discuss wether quadratic 
voting might help alleviate this problem. 
IV.  THE “POLICY INFLUENCE MOTIVE” 
One possible systematic exaggeration if when an individual 
wants to influence the decisions made by the government on 
issue 𝑘. The government is more likely to pay attention if 
surveys indicate full support for the reform. In other words, the 
target is 𝑡 1 if 𝑥 0, and 𝑡 1 if 𝑥 0, and there will 
be a strategic inflation in the reported intensity. In the polar 
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case where this policy influence motive is predominant, 
respondents will bunch at the extreme points of the Likert item. 
A. Assumptions 
To be more specific about the context, assume that 𝐾 
independent binary decisions have to be made by the 
government, say, implement a given reform or keep the status 
quo. In that case, 𝑥 ∈ 1, 1  is to be interpreted as the utility 
derived by individual 𝑖 if reform 𝑘 is implemented (compared to 
the status quo). Assume that a survey is run to evaluate the 
total utility that the implementation of each of the 𝐾 reforms is 
likely to generate. We assume that the signaling part of the 
utility function has the following form: 𝐺 𝑥 𝑥 𝑆 𝑥 , 
where 𝑆 𝑥  is the probability that the reform is implemented 
if the individual reports 𝑥  (with 𝑆 0). Note that in the 
strategic signaling motive, this “influence function” 𝑆  is 
weighted by how much the respondent is impacted by the reform 





𝛾 𝑥 𝑥  quadratic sincerity motive , 
 𝑆 𝑥 𝜎 𝑥  linear policy influence , 
where parameter 𝜎  captures the marginal impact of 𝑥  on 
the decision making process, and parameter 𝛾 0 describes 
the weight of the sincerity versus signaling motive on issue 𝑘. 
B. Optimal Responses under Likert 
Under Likert, it is easy to check that the optimal answers 
are in that case: 
 𝑥 sign 𝑥 min 1 |𝑥 |, 1 , (1) 
where sign 𝑥 1 if 𝑥 0 and sign 𝑥 1 if 𝑥 0. 
Expression (1) shows that the optimal answer has the same sign 
as the ‘true preference’ (no misreporting in the direction of the 
preferences), but the intensity is always exaggerated. The size of 
the exaggeration is increasing with the ratio . When this ratio 
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becomes large enough, the individual will choose to locate at one 
of the extremities of the [-1 , 1] scale. When such bunching 
occurs (in particular when only the policy influence motive is 
present 𝛾 0 ), the only information that can be learned with 
the Likert technology is the direction of the preference; nothing 
can be learnt about intensity. Note that this is the situation 
originally motivating the use of quadratic voting in the seminal 
work of Lalley and Weyl.19 
C. Optimal Responses under QVSR 
One solution to this problem of strategic exaggeration might 
be to make reporting extreme values more costly than reporting 
moderate values. This is the basic idea underlying QVSR.20 
Formally, assume that the set of feasible answers under QVSR 
is: 
𝑥 𝑥 , .  .  . , 𝑥 ∈ 1, 1 : 𝑥 𝐵 , 
where 𝐵 ∈ ℝ . 
Deriving the optimal answers under QVSR is more 
complicated since it involves solving a constrained maximization 
program. The details of the proof are relegated in a technical 
appendix. As one can check in the appendix, the optimal 
response on issue 𝑘 under QVSR is: 
 𝑥 sign 𝑥 min ∗ 1 |𝑥 |, 1 , (2) 
where 𝜆∗ is the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum. If ∑ 𝑥
𝐵, meaning that optimal answers under Likert are within the 
QVSR budget set, then 𝑥 𝑥  and 𝜆 0. If ∑ 𝑥 𝐵, 
optimal answers under Likert are not admissible under QVSR, 
and the individual has to report less extreme views. 
 
 19 See Weyl, 172 Pub Choice at 79–81 (cited in note 8). 
 20 Id. 
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D. Relative Performance of Likert and QVSR 
As intuition suggests, the relative performance of Likert vs 
QVSR depends on the relative strength of the sincerity motive 
and policy influence motive. If the policy influence motive is very 
weak compared to the sincerity motive (i.e.  close to 0), Likert 
items provide a good measure of preferences (see (1)). Indeed, 
reported views will be close to true opinions, with little bunching 
at extreme positions on the ordered responses. In that case, 
QVSR is not needed, and will even undermine the quality of the 
measure of preferences, since the binding budget constraint will 
prevent some respondents to report their true preferences. 
By contrast, if the policy influence motive is strong enough, 
Likert will provide a poor measure of the intensity of 
preferences, because strategic considerations will induce 
respondents to bunch at extreme values. In that case, QVSR 
might represent a substantial improvement over Likert. Indeed, 
by making extreme reports more costly, it decreases the 
bunching at extreme positions observed with Likert, and is thus 
likely to generate better quality information about the intensity 
of preferences. 
V.  THE “PARTISAN CONSISTENCY MOTIVE” 
A. Assumptions 
When answering political surveys, the policy influence 
motive is not the only motive that may induce respondents to 
distort their true preferences. Another interesting example is a 
situation where citizens have strong partisan identities, and 
where even if they disagree with their preferred party’s position 
on a specific issue, they suffer a psychological cost from 
reporting a divergent opinion. We will call this motive the 
“partisan consistency motive.”21 In that case, their signaling 
target 𝑡  on an issue is the position of the party with which they 
identify. 
 
 21 When one’s preferred party is not in power, the partisan consistency motive can 
additively interact with the policy influence motive: one might overreport agreement 
with abortion rights both because it is the right thing to do as a Democrat and because 
one wants to influence Republican policy on this issue. 
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Imagine a situation where party elites are very polarized, 
and consider an individual who generally agrees with her 
preferred party regarding the “direction” of the policy (that is, 
𝑥  and 𝑡  have the same sign on most issues), but who is 
generally less extreme (|𝑥 | |𝑡 | on most issues). Under 
Likert, such an individual, because she wants to look like a ‘good 
Republican’ or like a ‘good Democrat’, will pick more extreme 
answers than she would if she were just reporting truthfully her 
own opinion. 
To derive some simple closed-form solutions, we study a 
simple example with quadratic sub-utility functions for both the 
sincerity and the signaling motives. We assume that the utility 




𝛼 1 𝛽 𝑥 𝑥 𝛽 𝑥 𝑡 , 
with 𝛼 0 and 𝛽 ∈ 0,1 . Parameter 𝛼  is the importance put 
on issue 𝑘 when answering the survey, and parameter 𝛽  is the 
relative weight of the partisan consistency motive compared to 
the sincerity motive for issue 𝑘. 
B. Optimal Responses under Likert 
Under Likert technology, it is easy to check that the 
solution of this optimization program is: 
𝑥 1 𝛽 𝑥 𝛽 𝑡 . (3) 
If 𝛽 0 (only the sincerity motive is active), the individual has 
no incentive to misreport her view, and 𝑥 𝑥 . But as soon as 
𝛽 0, the individual has the incentive to move away from her 
true opinion in the direction of her partisan target. 
Note that under Likert, how much the individual values her 
answer to this question compared to other questions in the 
survey (parameter 𝛼 ) does not influence her answers. Indeed, 





2019] Understanding Survey Response 35 
 
C. Optimal Responses under QVSR 
Under QVSR technology, we show in the appendix that the 
optimal response on issue 𝑘 under QVSR is: 
𝑥 ∗ 1 𝛽 𝑥 𝛽 𝑡 , (4) 
where 𝜆∗ is the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum. 
D. Relative Performance of Likert and QVSR 
Note first that, as in the case of the policy influence motive, 
if the partisan motive is very weak compared to the sincerity 
motive (i.e. 𝛽  close to 0), Likert items provide a good measure 
of preferences (see (3)). In that case again, QVSR is not needed, 
and will even undermine the quality of the measure of 
preferences, since the binding budget constraint will prevent 
some respondents to report their true preferences. 
Consider now cases where the partisan motive can be 
potentially strong. As soon as the budget constraint is binding, 
compared to Likert, QVSR “shrinks” all answers towards the 
neutral answer (0). Expression (4) shows that this “contraction” 
can be heterogenous across issues: more points will be given to 
issues with a higher 𝛼 , meaning that respondents will put 
more points on issues that they consider as important. In that 
case, the relative performance of QVSR vs. Likert at measuring 
“true” opinions depends on the statistical relationship between 
𝛼  (the importance of the issue) and 𝛽  (the relative importance 
of the partisan motive compared to the sincerity motive). 
Depending on this relationship, either method can dominate. 
If, for an individual, the 𝛼  are the same for all issues, 
expression (4) shows that the optimal answers under QVSR are 
given, compared to Likert, by just ‘shrinking’ all answers 
proportionally towards the neutral answer (0), until one satisfies 
the budget constraint.22 If the partisan targets are more extreme 
than the respondents’ true views (|𝑡 | |𝑥 |), QVSR will move 
answers in the correct direction (compared to Likert). Yet, it is 
important to note that QVSR will not “purge” reported answers 
of the partisan motive: answers will still be a convex 
combination of the true opinion and the partisan target, with 
 
 22 More specifically, using condition (6) in the appendix, one can check that: 𝑥
∑
∗ 𝑥 . 
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exactly the same relative weights as under Likert. In that sense, 
QVSR will not perform better than Likert. 
If high 𝛼  tend to be associated with low 𝛽 , more votes will 
be put on issues with a strong sincerity motive, and QVSR might 
perform better than Likert at measuring “true opinions.” There 
are reasons to expect such a positive correlation between the 
importance of the issue and the strength of the sincerity motive. 
Indeed, consider an individual who cares strongly about some 
issues, and considers others as secondary or not very important. 
On the former set of issues, the individual will be ready to 
collect information, invest some time and effort to think about 
the pros and cons of various policies, and eventually form a 
strong, independent opinion. For such issues, the sincerity 
motive is likely to be strong and the partisan motive weak. By 
contrast, consider the issues in the latter set. Such issues are 
issues the individual does not really care about and has not 
thoughtfully reflected upon. In that case, she might be happy to 
use the party line as the main determinant of her answers. To 
make this argument more clearly, consider the extreme case 
where there are two types of issues: those about which the 
individual cares and where the sincerity motive is predominant, 
say 𝛼 1 and 𝛽 𝜀, with 𝜀 1, and those about which the 
individual does not care and where the partisan motive is 
predominant, say 𝛼 𝜀 and 𝛽 1 𝜀. In that case, under 
Likert, the individual will report her true opinion on the first set 
of issues, and will report her partisan target on the second set 
(See (3)). Under QVSR, assuming that the budget constraint is 
sufficiently binding, she will put no points on the second set of 
issues, and she will allocate all her points on the issues with a 
strong sincerity motive. In such a situation, QVSR is likely to 
represent a significant improvement over Likert. 
Note last that if high 𝛼  tend to be associated with high 𝛽 , 
the exact opposite argument will prevail and QVSR might 
perform worse than Likert. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We have good reasons to think that systematic biases in 
translating true into observed attitudes exist. We formally study 
how conflicting motives (more specifically, a sincerity motive, a 
policy-influence motive, and a partisan motive) may induce some 
tradeoffs when individuals answer survey questions. We show 
that QVSR performs better than Likert items on average when 
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this bias generates bunching toward one or both ends of the 
ordered response categories, or when across issues, there is a 
positive correlation between the strength of the sincerity motive 
and the general importance of the question to the respondent. 
Yet, we also highlight several limits, which indicate that a 
specific set of assumptions need to be tested before being able to 
decide, for each specific context, which instrument dominates. 
VII.  TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
A.1 Optimal Responses under QVSR: The “Policy Influence” 
Case 
Consider the “policy influence motive” case, with the 




𝛾 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝜎 𝑥 . 
Under QVSR, the individual maximizes her utility 𝑉  subject 
to the budget constraint ∑ 𝑥 𝐵. Write the Lagrangian as: 
ℒ 𝑥 , 𝜆
1
2
𝛾 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝜎 𝑥 𝜆 𝐵 𝑥 , 
where 𝜆  is the Lagrange multiplier. Taking the derivatives with 






























If ∑ 𝑥 𝐵: responses are the same as under Likert 
(the budget constraint is not binding, and at the optimum the 
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Note that the left-hand side of the equality is strictly 
decreasing in 𝜆 . It takes the value ∑ 𝑥 𝐵 when 𝜆 0, 
and it converges towards 0 as 𝜆  goes to ∞. Therefore, there 
exists a unique positive 𝜆  such that equality (5) is satisfied. 
Note that this value depends on all the parameters 𝛾
𝛾 , .  .  . , 𝛾 , 𝜎 𝜎 , .  .  . , 𝜎  and on the true preferences 𝑥
𝑥 , .  .  . , 𝑥 . Denoting the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum 
by 𝜆∗, under QVSR, the optimal response on issue 𝑘 is therefore: 
𝑥 sign 𝑥 min ∗ |𝑥 |, 1 , 
which is expression (2) in the main text. 
A.2 Optimal Responses under QVSR: The “Partisan 
Consistency” Case 
Consider the “partisan consistency motive” case, with the 




𝛼 1 𝛽 𝑥 𝑥 𝛽 𝑥 𝑡 . 




∑ 𝛼 1 𝛽 𝑥 𝑥 𝛽 𝑥 𝑡 𝜆 𝐵 ∑ 𝑥 , 
where 𝜆  is the Lagrange multiplier. First order condition with 
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If ∑ 𝑥 𝐵: responses are the same as under Likert (the 
budget constraint is not binding). 
If ∑ 𝑥 𝐵, then satisfying the budget constraint implies 
that: 
∑ 𝑥 𝐵. (6) 
Note that the left-hand side of the equality is strictly decreasing 
in 𝜆 , taking the value ∑ 𝑥  strictly higher than 𝐵 when 𝜆
0, and is converging towards 0 as 𝜆  goes to ∞. Therefore, there 
exists a unique positive 𝜆  such that equality (6) is satisfied. 
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum by 𝜆∗, the 







which is expression (4) in the main text. 
FIGURE 1:  MORAL ATTITUDES, DEMOCRATS 
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FIGURE 2:  MORAL ATTITUDES, REPUBLICANS 
 
FIGURE 3:  MORAL ATTITUDES (STANDARD DEVIATION), 
DEMOCRATS 
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FIGURE 4:  MORAL ATTITUDES (STANDARD DEVIATION), 
REPUBLICANS 
 
FIGURE A1:  ECONOMIC ATTITUDES, DEMOCRATS 
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FIGURE A2:  ECONOMIC ATTITUDES, REPUBLICANS 
 
FIGURE A3:  ECONOMIC ATTITUDES (STANDARD DEVIATION), 
DEMOCRATS 
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FIGURE A4:  ECONOMIC ATTITUDES (STANDARD DEVIATION), 
REPUBLICANS 
 
